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This paper proposes to examine the logic of analogy as a form of 
religious discourse in the writings of Eric Lionel Mascall and Charles 
Hartshorne. The problem is to exhibit the response of these men to 
the question:. In what way and to what degree is discourse about God 
analogical? 
Delimiting the Scope 
A number of factors limit the scope of this study. First, the use 
of analogy as a theological method has a rich and intricate history.1 
Secondly, there is selective judgment in the decision to utilize the 
doctrine of analogy in St. Thomas Aquinas as representative of all 
theological analogy. Manifold interpretations of his doctrine alone 
have been penned and any portrayal of said doctrine is at best an 
approximation of a highly complex teaching. Thirdly, it will be assumed 
by the writer that there is a degree of familiarity with the anti-
metaphysical bias of "logical positivism" or "logical empiricism" 
which stands as the backdrop of any study which attempts to deal with 
the question of theological discourse and its cognitive validity. 
For the sake of review some of the most basic theses of a dogmatic 
philosophical "empiricism" may be summarized as follows: 
a. The function of philosophy is logical analysis...philosophy 
has become the logical analysis of science through the syn-
tactical analysis of scientific language. 
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b. All cognitively significant (meaningful) discourse is divisible 
without remainder into analytic or synthetic propositions. 
c. Any propositionAhatIpurports to be factual or empirical has 
meaning only if it is possible in principle to describe a 
method for its verification. 
d. All metaphysical assertions, being neither analytic nor syn-
thetic propostions are meaningless. 
e. There is a single language for all science; it is similar in 
form to the language of physics, and all synthetic propositions 
are reducible to elementary experiences expressible in this 
language. 
f. All normative assertions, whether positing moral, aesthetic, 
or religious values, are scientifically unverifiable, and are 2  
therefore to be classified as forms of non-cognitive discourse. 
Fourthly, selection from the writings of the men in question was functional. 
This is particularly true in the case of E. L. Mascall who serves to 
illustrate the radically analogical position against which Hartshorne 
reacts and equally true in the case of Ian T. Ramsey who serves only as 
an illuminative parallel to Hartshorne's doctrine of analogy and religious 
language. Properly stated, then, this study will attempt to delineate 
the doctrine of analogy and religious language in the writings of Charles 
Hartshorne, Mascall and Ramsey serving as functional points of contrast 
and comparison respectively. 
Purpose and Importance of this Study 
The question of the validity of religious language in a secular 
age is one to which theology must definitively address itself. Linguistic 
analysis has hurled the charge of the impossibility and nonsensicality 
of theological assertions at the door of theology. Such a charge, unless 
defused, aims to detonate the core of the systematic enterprise. Analogy 
has been regarded as one method of defusing the analysts' bomb. If this 
is true, then it must be vitally central to the whole task of systematic 
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theology.3 Such statements as the one by W. S. Taylor that "analogy has 
been regarded as being of the greatest homiletic and pedagogic value in 
communicating the truth, but as of questionable value in apprehending the 
truth"4 deserve examination through comparison with those who speak 
with theological and philosophical eloquence on the matter. Such a 
study also has fringe benefits. Both John Macquarrie in his God-Talks  
and Schubert Ogden in his The Reality of God6 indicate that the issue 
of analogy is central in the writings of such theological giants as Barth 
and Bultmann. In short, if analogy is capable of establishing the validity 
of theological discourse, then it is of inestimable value to the systematician- 
apologete in his dialogue with the world. 
One important aspect of this study may be the oblique way in which 
it demonstrates how the suppositions of a system determine the range of 
its flexibility and the degree of its insight. This may be tacitly seen 
in the degree to which the supernaturalism of Thomism necessitates its 
own peculiar doctrine of analogy, and the panentheism of Hartshorne logically 
entails its own type of teaching on analogy and religious language. It 
is hoped that both the subtlety and complexity of the relationship between 
suppositions and their derived effects will be perceived in these systems. 
Methodology and Sources 
The methodology of this study is designed to respond to the basic 
problematic question aforementioned by dealing with Mascall, as a re-
presentative of Thomism, and Ian T. Ramsey, as one to whom Hartshorne 
acknowledges his indebtedness, in relation to and in,contrast and comparison 
with Charles Hartshorne. In so far as Hartbhorne finds great argument with 
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classical Thomism and its doctrine of God which, he claims, forbids genuine 
analogy)  Chapter II will briefly survey the general Thomistic doctrine of 
God as it substantiates the doctrine of analogy and then offer a brief 
view of Mascall's interpretation of the logic of analogy and his theory 
of knowledge which undergirds the same. This chapter will also point 
to some current misgivings concerning such a doctrine of analogy as cognitively 
valid. Chapter III will offer a brief explication of the "neoclassical" 
or "panentheistic" doctrine of God as the logical basis for understanding 
Hartshorne's statements on analogy and religious language in Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV will present those statements. Chapter V will offer an 
exposition of Ian T. Ramsey's views on religious language. This will 
be done on the recommendation by Hartshorne of the second chapter of 
Ramsey's Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases, 
a work, incidentally, which Hartshorne views as germane to his -awn thinking. 
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the study and offers some tentative con- 
clusions and critical questions. 
Major sources used in the study include some of the writings of the 
men mentioned above. Specific attention, as can be seen in the bibliography, 
is given to the writings of Charles Hartshorne. None of the writers were 
read exhaustively. Rather, a representative sample was sought. The 
initial unfamiliarity with the nature of analogy necessitated widespread 
reading in the general area of analogy and religious language. 
CHAPTER II 
THE THCflISTIC DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY: 
AN INTERPRETATION 
The basis of the Thomistic doctrine of analogy is found in the 
metaphysical presuppositions concerning the nature of God. For St. 
Thomas the question of ontology precedes that of epistemology. The 
five proofs for the existence of God establish his reality, only there-
after does the search for God's essence, for what he is, become operative. 
It is axiomatic that we do not confront God in the same manner in which 
we confront existent things. We know God only indirectly, obliquely. 
What can be known is his creative causality. Thus, St. Thomas asserts 
that by virtue of our awareness of effects, all of which imply a cause, 
we are led 
to know of God that He exists, and to know of Him what must 
necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, 
exceeding all things caused by Him. Hence we know His relation-
ship with creatures, that is, He is the cause of all things; 
also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in 
any way caused by them; and that His effects are removed from 
Him, not by reason of 4ny defect on His part, but because He 
superexceeds them all. 
As this first cause, God is simple,8 that is to say, He is not a body 
composed of matter and form:9 Rather, He is pure form.1° As pure form, 
there is no distinction between existence and essence, between that He is 
and what He is. Any rift between these two would place God in the 
category of caused things. His unity forbids placement in any genus. 
Similarly, it eschews contingency. 
St. Thomas established rigorous canons of knowledge which set 
limits both on the cognition of God and on attribution to Him. According 
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to Aristotle, Thomas's mentor, we derive the knowledge of an object 
through genus, differentia, accidents, or properties. By St. Thomas's 
very definition of God genus, differentia, and accidents are excluded 
as a means of knowing God's essence. Properties, however, can be 
applied to God in three ways. First, there are negative properties or 
attributes such as simplicity, infinity, immutability, etc. Secondly, 
there are the names which describe a relationship, such as First Cause. 
Finally, there is positive attribution, for example, "good," "wise," 
"loving," etc.
11 
It is in the third category, the category,of positive attribution, 
that Thomas makes the familiar distinctions between univocal, equivocal 
and analogical attribution. In Book I, chapters 30-34, of his Summa 
Contra Gentiles Thomas acknowledges that attributes which we abstract 
from the particularity of human finitude are applied to God and present 
in Him in the appropriately divine form.
12 
It is to be remembered, however, 
that ultimately all properties are reducible in God to a simplicity that 
is the hallmark of His unity. In so far as God is He in whom essence and 
existence are united, His mode of being forces us to refine our speech 
about Him. Such caution about positive attribution drives us onto the 
path of negation. Such humble reticence demeans the possibility of 
applying human qualities in the same sense or univocally. Such predication 
would mean the transcription of God into an anthropomorphic super-man 
reminiscent of mythological heroism. On the other hand, since God is the 
source of all creaturely attributes, it is not admissible to treat those 
applied attributes equivocal1y, that is to say, in such totally different 
7 
senses that their only claim to commonality is the form and sound of 
the written or spoken word. Thomas cites the example of using the word 
“clubil to refer to a weapon and to a group of people.13 The danger of 
such equivocation with respect to atttibutes applied to God is that it 
results in "metaphysical agnosticism,fl
14 
a stark emptiness with respect 
to the content of our assertions about God. 
The recognition of such a range for theological predication - from 
univocity to equivocity - establishes, as one writer has noted, logically 
disjunctive polarities by which to conceive the relationship of God and man. 
On the one hand, there is univocal identity, absolute likeness, immanence, 
pantheism; on the other hand, there is equivocal separation, dissimilarity, 
transcendence, atheism.15 Between the Scylla and Charybdis of such dis-
junction the Thomistic doctrine of analogy winds its way as the via media. 
Ferre states the crisis and the solution this way: 
   
There seems no escape. If univocal, then language falls into 
anthropomorphism and cannot be about God; if equivocal, then 
language bereft of its meaning leads to agnosticism and cannot 
for us be about God. But at this point it is the contention of 
a major theological tradition that between the univocal and the 
equivocal lies a third logically important employment of language 
which can provide theological discourse with a live alternative 
to both anthropomorphi9m and agnosticism. This "middle way" is 
the logic of analogy. 
This doctrine of the "middle way" spreads out diversely in many 
of St. Thomas's writings. The following presentations of various categories 
of analogy are meant to reflect a cautious judgment and reserve in selection. 
There have been a number of exhaustive treatments of this doctrine in 
St. Thomas, more than one of which notes that there is no uniform doctrine 
of analogy readily perceptible.17 
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In Book I, chapter 34,  of Summa Contra Gentiles two types of analogy 
are distinguishable. These are the analogy of proportion or attribution 
and the analogy of proportionality. 
The analogy of attribution is divided further into two classes, 
analogy duorum ad tertium and analogy unius ad alterum, the former being 
dependent on the latter. In the first of these, multiple entities are 
unified by a common attribute which refers to a third entity which the 
many (or the two) have as a common background or point of reference.
18 
As an example, Thomas refers to the one health, common to all, by which 
we are able to say that Dan animal is healthy as the subject of health, 
medicine is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, urine as its 
sign.u19 The adjective, "healthy," then, can be applied to Florida as 
a place which brings about health or to the complexion of the person 
living there, but both cases have meaning only as that adjective applies 
fundamentally to the person as the third entity in which these diverse 
forms of the adjective find their common rootage. Here Mascall says, 
',It is he (the person) who is (in the scholastic sense) formally healthy 
and is the prime analogate.“
20 
As a mode of theological discourse, however, this first type is 
deficient in that there exists no third being antecedent or anterior to 
God and the creature to whom predicates can apply formally. Such a 
deficiency necessitates a more direct type of analogy, that of attribution-
proportion unius ad alterum. In this case the prime analogate possesses 
characteristics in a "formal" manner, in the full univocal sense, while 
its analogate participates in the characteristic or attribute only relatively 
or in a derivative sense.21 Thus, an asymmetrical relationship obtains 
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between the two analogates. God, in order to insure the validity of 
religious discourse, ought to possess all characteristics formally in 
order that human attributes may be used analogously, albeit relatively. 
It is, however, a major contention of Mascall that there are limitations 
to this analogy of extrinsic attribution, the analogy unius ad alterum. 
Mascall calls to his aid the distinction in St. Thomas between the formal 
possession of attributes and virtual possession. The logic of the 
distinction is as follows: 
Creatures are good (formally but finitely), God is the cause of 
them all and of all that they have, therefore the word "good" 
applied to God neRa not mean any more than that he is able to 
produce goodness. 
This type of analogy, then, tells us little more than that God is the 
cause of finite phenomena, itself a suspicious analogy open to the 
criticism of cognitive invalidity (infra, pp. 14-15) 
In so far as the analogy of attribution results in a skepticism 
with respect to formal knowledge of the properties of God, the analogy 
of proportionality is often utilized to counter the negative effects 
of that skepticism. This form of analogy serves as an antidote by 
asserting that any word which is applied to two entities is literally 
true of both, although the predicate will be understood in light of the 
mode or manner of being appropriate to the being in question. Thus 
the word "leg,“ for instance, can apply to that of a table or of a man2  
but only if we take note of the similarity of function designated by that 
word on the one hand and the general dissimilarity by virtue of their 
23 
quite different modes of being on the other hand. This type of analogy 
is not to be confuse] With metaphorical comparison. In metaphor a similarity 
10 
of effects between two entities does not necessitate that both possess 
the same formal characteristic as in this analogy. Thus, for example, 
a lion so designated the 'king of beasts' does not possess the formal 
characteristic of kingship even though we designate his dominating role 
as similar in effect. 
Commonly, the analogy of proportionality takes on a "quasi-mathematical" 
form: 
attribute of x attribute of y  
essence of x — essence of y 
Here both x and y share a common attribute. Thus, we speak of the "life" 
of both an elephant and a cabbage, for example. Mascall warns, however, 
that the attribute shared is never shared equally, for, even though common 
attribution is present, the given attribute applied to x is actually 
determined by its own nature or essence, while that same attribute applied 
to y is moulded according to the essence or mode of being of y.25 The 
attributes, then, while applied mutually, are really self-contained and 
indigenous to the nature of the items in question. Such an indigeneity 
of the attribute has led the scholastic to call this the analogy of 
intrinsic attribution. 
The result of such analogy is the conclusion that there is no 
logical connection or equality in the sense of a basic similarity of 
the shared attribute. One student of analogy, T. W. Silkstone, has 
argued that this results from a misappropriation of the mathematical 
idiom which, when applied for use in theological discourse, yields 
the conclusion of equivocation.26 In a mathematical proportion a knowledge- 
11 
yielding pattern is effected only when three of the four terms are given. 
Thus, in the proportion 2:3:04:6 knowledge of the left-hand terms allows 
for inference of the final term when one of the right-hand terms is known. 
The dilemma in using this type of analogy as a mode of theological discourse 
is that, strictly speaking, neither the attributes nor the essence of God 
can be known according to the Thomistic via negativa.27 Thus, the use 
of human attributes to speak of God dissipates into equivocation in spite 
of the good intention of the analogy of proportionality. With no link 
between the right and left-hand sides of the analogy a ',pseudo -equation,“
28 
nonsensical by nature, results. It is as fruitful as saying 2:3::Apples: 
Oranges.29 
It is, however, the contention of Mascall that this chasm of equivocation 
can be crossed with the real relation implicit in the notion of First Cause. 
The bond between the isolated sides of the analogy of proportionality is 
furnished by an:,analogy of attribution (causality). He cites the scholastic 
philosopher Garrigou-Lagrange at this point: 
In these equations two created terms are known directly, one 
uncreated term is known indirectly by way of causality and 
we infer the fourth term which is known indirectly in a positive 
manner as regards what is analogically common with creatures 
and in a negative and relative manner as regards its proper 
divine mode.30 
The creative act, then, places creation in a participatory relationship 
with the perfections of God albeit in a non-essential manner with regard 
to quidditive knowledge of Him. Mascall again looks to scholastic 
philosophy for this insight: 
Analogous perfections are thus not pure relations. They are 
perfections which imply in the creature a composition of two 
12 
correlative elements, potentiality and act, but which in God 
are pure act. Our intelligence conceives that they are realized 
more fully according as they are purified of all potentiality; 
in God they exist therefore in the pure state. le thus see that 
there are not two unknowns in the proportionality set up by 
theology.31  
The analogy of being, then, makes analogical predication possible. Creation, 
as effect-implying-cause, is rooted in the act of God by which He exists 
and stands as a pointer to the effulgent creativity of the Creator. All 
attributes participate in such power. So Mascall concludes: 
The goodness of God is thus declared to be self-existent good-
ness, and, as such, identical not merely with God's essence but 
with the act by which God exists. Analogy does not enable us 
to conceive God's goodness as Identical with his essence but to 
affirm it as identical with his existence.32  
Knowledge of God's essence, then, is never conceptual. Analogical knowledge 
is the only valid insight in that analogies of attribution and proportionality 
interlock to explain how predication about God has been going on all along. 
In order to affirm the use of analogy Mascall develops a theory of 
apprehension which is designed to meet the "sensationalist" (strict positivist) 
position on divine knowledge. The author claims that there is an erroneous 
dichotomy in force when one asserts that the senses merely apprehend, while 
the intellect goes on to reason. Instead, the intellect is apprehensive. 
It apprehends not only truths but objects.33 Mascall postulates a three-
fold theory of apprehension: 1) the essence of perception is not sense 
awareness, but intellectual apprehension: "the intellect uses the sensible 
phenomenon as an objectum quo, through which it passes to the apprehension 
of objectum quod which is the intelligible trans-sensible being"; 2) the 
intelligible object is graspedithrough sensible phenomena, not deduced from 
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or constructed out of them; 3) an attitude of "involvement, contemplation, 
and penetration's is a prerequisite for penetration beneath the sensible 
phenomena to the "real intelligible things„ supporting them.3b It is on 
such a basis that Mascall is able to affirm that God as cause is perceived 
through created effects. This is not, however, to belittle the sense of 
Godts mystery. The nature of man's apprehension of trans-sensible entities 
remains dim and obscure, yet perceptible nonetheless.35 That very perceptibility 
is what makes analogy viable and valid. For, if analogical statements about 
God are possible, utilizing as they do words whose primary application is 
to finite beings apprehended through senses, then "there must be a certain 
affinity between God and finite things which is not excluded by the radical 
difference which we have seen to characterize their existential status.n36 
Christian imagery, thought, and discourse, then, are anchored in two realms, 
both controlled by God: the natural world and the Church. As the effects 
allow perceptibility of the divine, so Christian imagery stands as a mode 
of apprehension in that 
the image or the image-complex, like the word or the word-complex, 
is an objectum quo, by the entertainment and contemplation of 
which the ndngl Ts able to enter into intimate conitive union 
with the reality of which it is a manifestation.)(  
God gives great images to the Church, rooted in the natural world and 
fulfilled in Christ, so that 
in our thought and speech about him as in all else, God does not 
destroy the powers of our nature but confirms them and validates 
them, even in the act b which he makes them the raw material of 
supernature and grace.30 
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Criticism 
The history of criticism of both the Thomistic doctrine of analogy 
and the metaphysical presuppositions undergirding it is varied and complex. 
In modern times the critiques of the proofs of God's existence devised 
by Immanuel Kant and David Hume have had long-range effects. In the arena 
of, systematics Karl Barth's persistent refusal to admit the analogia entis 
as a basis for natural knowledge and speaking about God is monumental 
of stature in the post-Kantian era. Common to all criticisms, however, 
seems to be a general displeasure with a radically analogical theory of 
divine knowledge in so far as it is predicated on the notion of causation 
or creation. Dorothy Emmet summarizes many of the basic criticisms in 
these words; 
There may yet be some fundamental relation or relations of 
finite actuality to absolute reality transcending it. But 
to describe this relation as that of things to a 'First Cause' 
will not do, unless more explicit recognition than we find in 
St. Thomas's Five Ways is given to the fact that the word 
'cause' tan' here be only used analogically. And if the word 
'cause' is here only used analogically, can it define the re-
lation in virtue of which we draw analogies?39 
If one begins with the fundamental "theistic assumption that God is in-
finite," which forbids on the philosophical level any genuine "material 
mode" of speech about the properties of supernatural beings, then analogy 
must explicate analogy.0  And thus,Thomism, dealing as it does with the 
absolute uniqueness of God - that primary fact that God is "over against 
and above His creation" in a self-subsistent manner, unrelated in any 
explicit way,--cannot, despite the doctrine of analogy, rescue itself from 
the basic nihilism which broods along the negative way.141  In short, without 
some similitude in relationship, literally apprehensible as a common logos, 
15 
difficulty haunts the doctrine of analogy. Here McIntyre says: 
We must firmly remember that all of our knowledge of God 
cannot be analogical; otherwise we would not know that it 
Was so. We have to have non-analogical knowledge with which to 
compare analogical and by which to judge its accuracy. Here 
J. S. Mill's word becomes extremely relevant: theological 
inquiry must accept as its goal the reduction of the area of 
analogical affirmation...ultimately analogies establish them-
selves not by their conformity to the rubrics of medieval or 
modern logic, or yet ittl the requirements of an anti-metaphysical 
metaphysic, but by the living relation in which they stand to 
the living Word of God, to the worshipping and obedient community, 
and to the salvation of Godfs children.42 
CHAPTER III 
THE NEOCLASSICAL DOCTRINE CF GOD 
In Chapter II the tension between the possibility and impossibility 
of theological discourse was discussed. We saw that Thomas Aquinas asserted 
three kinds of attribution to God — negative, relational, and positive. 
We further discovered that attempts at positive attribution, applying 
human predicates to divinity, could be either univocal or equivocal, 
necessitating analogical predication. E. L. Mascall contended that 
the analogy of attribution or the relational attribution of First Cause 
is necessary in order to avoid the agnostic implications of the equivocal 
analogy of proportionality which contains isolated terms on either side 
of the proportion. He further concludes that both types of analogy must 
be retained in theological discourse, the analogy of attribution claiming 
a logical priority. A further contention of Mascall was that analogy is 
actually a mode of apprehension carried on by the intellect without which 
thought of God is impossible. We finally noted that the analogical notion 
of "creative causality" was held suspect by some, particularly in the 
Kantian tradition, as incapable of yielding literal knowledge of God. 
Charles Hartshorne, philosopher of religion in the tradition of 
personalism and process philosophy,43takes as a point of departure the 
obeisance of this classical tradition to the Infinity of God. The via 
..10MM•••••• 
negative is the fundamental error of that great tradition. 44 With the 
aid of a cursory overview of his doctrine of God, the metaphysical basis 
for his own doctrine of analogy and religious language, we shall investigate 
his assertion that the negative attributes of God — infinity, eternity, 
immutability, etc, — spell the demise of logical talk about God. 
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The judgment that the negative way of Thomism forbids true analogical 
discourse is predicated on Hartshorne's understanding of the Thomistic 
God as "absolute and totally exempt from relations to the creatures.m45  
With regard to analogy he states of the Thomistic doctrine of God: 
To say, we know, not God, but something to which we know that 
God is analogous, does not meet my argument. Analogy involves 
relation, thus: 'fife know there is Something to which the world 
is related as effect to cause." If the relation is in God, then 
he is relative. If it is in the world, then the world has relation* 
to-God, and since this is a complex which includes God, and since;  
God has, by hypothesis, only absolute being, the world must include 
this absolute being. Otherwise, what the world has is not relation-
to-God, but relation-to, and nowhere, in the world or in God, is 
there any such relation as the analogy involves. So "the analogy 
of being" fails to prov4e an answer to the question, what do we 
know when we know God?114° 
God, then, must be literally related to the world; to assert otherwise, 
contends Hartshorne, is to claim the God is unknowable. In a qualified 
univocal sense God is temporal and spatial, dependent and complex, conscious 
and good, purposive and powerful. God is, however, more than His relations 
which obtain with the world. Hartshorne states that the "all" (the world) 
is in God, but not co-terminous with Him. Hartshorne disclaims pantheism. 
Rather, he holds to a doctrine of "di-polar theism" or "panentheism" which 
states that there is a unified polarity in God of finite and infinite, 
actual and potential, becoming and fixed being, contingent and necessary  
God is the Process-Itself, the process of actualization by which events 
become actual, passoon into actuality, the finite "pole" of God, forming 
a novel moment of that pole of God and, in turn, furnishing new data 
in the process, while together with such a pole the inherent possibility 
of future events. He states: 
18 
The inclusive principle [of actualizatiOlis not something utterly 
mysterious to be called being, which is neither in contrast nor 
not in contrast to becoming, but process itself, with a face of 
"actuality" (in the literal sense, for there is here no other), 
viewed in one temporal direction, and of “potentialityle viewed 
in the other, with an eternal factor of abstract being common to 
all such potentiality." 
God, then, claims unique metaphysical status not, as in Thomism, 
because of what He is not, but because of what He is, namely, positive 
"all-relatedness." The negative side of God, His non-relatedness, is 
not to be conceived as sheer negativity, but rather as His omni-possibility. 
The conjunction of these two facets is designated by Hartshorne as "modal 
coincidence," meaning that the necessarily all-inclusive must be one 
whose potentiality for change is co-extensive with the logically poss- 
. ible and that God "is the Whole in every categorial sense, all actuality 
(d*.\ in one individual actuality, and all possibility in one individual 
potentiality.115° As the Whole, then, there is no being or principle 
save God alone which is the necessary ground of whatever exists or is 
even possible. 
Hartshorne goes on to claim that God can be conceived as the "in-
finite personal existence or creative becoming" in the literal sense and 
that one can assert 
God's independence of the actual world (in his abstract identity) 
without saying he is wholly external to it, and one can affirm 
his inclusion of the actual world (in his concrete existence) 
without denying that the world as actual is completely contingent 
and radically dependent on him as its sole necessary ground.5  
As Supreme Person, God possesses a determinate "body" or the actual 
limitations of finitude as the process-up-to-now; but simultaneously 
he possesses the indeterminate freedom which is the freedom to harmonize 
all the indeterminate choices of creation or potentiality. Novelty, then, 
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is possible only in so far as the infinity of God is the totality of 
conceivable finite realities, the infinity of his possible finite roles.
52 
God is thus bound in a unique, all-encompassing way to what is$ while 
free to become whatever might become. He is that web of interaction as 
the "universal individual," "the unity of a sequence of concrete states 
of consciousness each connected with the others in the most truly ideal 
way by omniscient memory and steadfastness of purpose.“53 God is literally 
structurally related to all beings in a universal manner and is relevant 
to all contexts. No longer can He afford to be conceived as the "causa 
sui" or self-derived being of classical metaphysics.% In short, rather 
than a blank substance requiring nothing but itself to exist or Being as 
atemporal absolute, God as the paradigmatic self is fully relational, 
social, and temporal, the ever-changing process whose immutability consists 
in the unique manner in which He integrates the distinct modes of past, 
present, and future.55 In the following chapter we shall examine the im-
port of such a doctrine for a theory of analogy and religious language. 
CHAPTER IV 
HARTSHORNE'S DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE 
In Chapter III a brief survey of Hartshorne's doctrine of God 
revealed his teaching that God is to be conceived as the eminent Self 
who is totally related as the ground of any and all relationships to 
a universe of nondivine beings. He is finite in so far as he contains 
all actuality, infinite in so far as he is the omnipossibility of 
all future and novel relationships. His environment is internal, that 
is to say, he can never be spatially and temporally defined locally or 
fragmentarily.56 His absolute character consists in his all-relatedness, 
abstract in nature, which, while relative to all, is relative to no one 
thing externally and so is able to serve as the basis for any and all 
realities. 
Hartshorne contends that such relatedness is the key to a proper 
doctrine of analogy. He says: 
It was held that while ordinary individuals interact, God's 
superiority is that he acts only (actus purus) and does not 
interact. UnforthDately, this destroys illinalogy between 
God and creatures.'? 
It is the paradigm of self or God as the Cosmic Interacting Whole which 
furnishes the basis for religious discourse. The dimension of totality 
is the key to understanding the religious definition of the word 'God'. 
It is in worship that such a dimension is perceived. Worship is the 
"integrating of all one's thoughts and purposes,n58 a consciously unitary 
response to life. Such an integrity is possible only in correlation 
with the experience of the "cosmic or all-inclusive whole [as] an integrated 
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individual, the sole non-fragmentary individual.,69 In the injunctions 
for total response which are common to worship (for example, "Thou shalt 
love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy mind and with 
all thy soul and with all thy strength.") lies the implication that every 
response must, in fact, be a way of loving God. From this it follows 
that God must be related to every experience, for "if God is in all things, 
he is in our experiences and also in what we experience, and thus is 
in some fashion a universal datum of experience.“6° Thus, in much the 
same way as the word 'I' serves as the indicator of integrity for all 
human experiences of the self, so God stands as the integrity of all 
experience. In worship alone with its apodictic demand for unbroken, 
universal response is the presence of deity evoked as the basis of 
all reality. Language itself, as part of that total reality, exhibits 
the presence of deity. Thus, Hartshorne contends, 'God' is 
not simply another word in our language but, if anything 
rational, a name for the principle back of every word in 
any possible language. He is not merely another topic to 
think about, but the all-pervasive medium of knowledge and 
things known, t9 recognize whom is a way of thinking about 
no matter whom.61  
Hartshorne goes on to assert that any denial of God as this necessary, 
all-inclusive background of experience and language is an explicit 
acceptance of the contingent and the accidental as absolute. Rather, 
as the human self binds up its contingent properties in a unified whole 
and is the necessary ground of the possibility of contingency, God acts 
as Necessary First Cause, not in the sense of external creator, but as 
the logical possibility and matrix of accidental occurrences, as the 
existent who must exist, even if it is as the experience of the non-being 
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of anything. He is the "being which will be there no matter what else 
is there."62 As noted above, one cannot deny this without contending 
with the resulting capricious absurdity of conceiving the accidental 
as simply accidental. 
Hartshorne wishes to distinguish this doctrine of necessity and 
causality from the Thomistic doctrine of First Cause as actus purus. 
In no way is the necessary independent of the contingent. He says: 
Thus,the first cause is not in every sense independent of other 
causes, but rather in its essence it depends upon (in the sense 
of necessitating or omnipotently requiring) the class of con-
tingent beings as such, while in its accidents the necessary 
being (necessary only in essence and as to having some accidents 
or oth2;) depends upon just what contingent beings in fact 
exist. 
The necessary and the contingent, then, constitute one interdependent 
reality, the unity and wholeness of which is known in worship and 
spoken of in language. In such a scheme the word 'God' operates as 
the logical president over all contingent linguistic expressions in 
the same manner in which the word 'I' presides over contingent acts 
as the necessary possibility of their occurrence.64 
Linguistic analysis must take the notion of necessity seriously. 
The principle of verification, regarding as it does all existence as 
contingent, is actually is "impious in principle."65 Rather, those 
concerned with the logic of theological statements should assay theo-
logical statements as belonging to the general class of metaphysical 
assertions which are not susceptible to the fragmentary metaphysic 
of positivism. It is only in such a stance that one will notice that 
in worship metaphysical statements take on a specificity of content 
which points to the way the variable details of contingent experience 
are woven into a constant structure and integrated sense of wholeness.66 
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In an article, "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and 
Existential," Hartshorne delineates this intimate relationship between 
the necessary and the contingent (which is, of course, paralleled by 
all the polarities in God - infinite and finite, free and determined, 
possible and actual, becoming and fixed being). Here he notes that 
there are three categories of linguistic statements. First, there are 
ordinary factual statements, fragmentary in character, designated as 
partially restrictive of existential (contingent) possibilities. 
Secondly, there are completely restrictive statements, wholly negative, 
which express an impossible state of affairs such as "nothing exists." 
Such a statement is impossible because the verifying experience of it 
must exist. Finally, there are completely nonrestrictive statements 
which are universal, necessary and existential. He notes these assertions 
as follows: 
Necessarily, something exists. 
Necessarily, experience occurs. 
Necessarily, creative synthesis occurs. 
Necessarily, there are concrete actualities all of which are 
both externally and internally related, both absolute and relative. 
Necessarily, divine or infallible experience, having fallible 
experience among its objects, occurs.°7  
The necessity of such assertions rests in the inconceivability of their 
contraries, so that literal assertions about the divine entail "...the 
absence of any positive meaning for the denial of a statement or - the 
same thing - the failure of the statement to exclude any positive state 
of affairs.1168 Metaphysics cannot seek after any partially restrictive 
truth, as though God were an infinite fact, but rather seeks to explicate 
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what would be real about the world no matter what possibilities were 
actualized and which cannot be denied without self-contradiction. At 
this point Hartshorne explicitly works within the restraint of 
Popper's canon of conceivable falsifiability, that canon which states 
that verification in science is not as important as conceivable falsification E9 
Theological-metaphysical statements, then,seek to designate the 
common factors in all experience: 
If 'information, means a description of what distinguishes 
one state of affairs from other conceivable states, then 
necessary statements are not informative; but if 'information,  
includes reference to the factor which all possible positive 
states of eiistel)8e have in common, then necessary statements 
are informative.' 
Ftrthermore„ such statements, drawn as they are from the all-inclusive 
process and interrelationship of the necessary and contingent, are 
capable of literal application, both in a qualified and strict sense, 
to deity. The emergence of a linguistic world or accident from that 
',indeterminate determinable potentiality for possible worlds;' which 
is the same for Hartshorne as the "necessary," is capable of being 
literally denotative of deity in so far as the necessary is the re-
cipient of the accidental and the supreme cause is also the supreme 
effect.71 Thus, while the attribution of a fixed aspect of reality 
to an aspect of the all-inclusive process is literally correct, it 
is infinitely far from a complete description of him. Attributions 
are literal in the qualified sense of being an actual portion of reality, 
but non-literal in their adequacy to do full justice to the Process - 
Itself. 
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Hartshorne combines the above insights into an explicit statement 
on religious language in an article entitled, "Three Strata of Meaning 
in Religious Discourse." The thetic statement of that article reads 
as follows: 
God is symbolically ruler, but analogically conscious and 
loving, and literally both absolute (or necessary) in 
existence and relative (or contingent) in aqIuality - that 
is, in the concrete modes of His existence. 
Religious language, then, operates on three levels: 1) the symbolic 
level; 2) the literal level; 3) the "problematic" or analogical level. 
The first stratum deals with material predications concerning deity. 
Since God, the Integral Whole, cannot be compared with the part, literal 
application of designations like "rock," "shepherd," "fountain," etc. 
are not possible. As mentioned previously (supra, p. 22), Hartshorne 
feels that the dilemma of positivism with its bewitbhment over the 
particular has lost divinity in fragmentariness (not all-encompassing, 
integral finitude) and placed him in the class of partially restrictive 
statements.73 
The second stratum deals with the formal predicates applicable to 
deity. Here we deal With metaphysical attributes such as "eternal," 
"immutable," "impassive." While negative in appearance, these are 
actually the abstract principles of the concrete identity of the divine 
(supra] p. 18, footnote 51). Like those attributes of the human self, 
God's attributes are abstract expressions of a concrete web of experience 
and, therefore, are positive in content, though negative in form. 
These particular formal attributes are radically unlike human ones, however, 
in their comprehensiveness. They are meant to 
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define that sense of his eminence or perfection which is indeed 
statically complete, an absolute maximum. But, because they 
are in themselves nothing more than abstractions, they are far 
from constituting the whole of his perfection which is some-
thing unimaginably concrete: the ever new synthesis into his 
own everlastinghand all-embracing life of all that has been or 
ever shall be."4  
In summary, these formal attributions are positive because concrete 
and, in the terms of the article previously mentioned, "existential." 
They are literal because they conceptualize according to the canon of 
literalness, the principle of all or none, of necessary truth or falsity. 
Thus, they are literal (nonrestrictive) and positive expressions of the 
universal character of God because he is the all-inclusive participant 
(as supreme necessary cause), on the one hand, and all-inclusive relatum 
(as supreme contingent effect), on the other hand. Both poles are 
literally true and attributable, because as finitude he embraces all 
factuality of the process-up-to-now, while as infinitude he tt. Table in 
his mode of potentiality to embrace all actual worlds which may come 
to be through the contingent acts of creatures. 
By way of excursus it is useful to note that Hartshorne has found 
argument with Paul Tillichis doctrine of a "super-theistic God" who 
is alleged to transcend both poles, thereby rendering di-polar state-
ments non-litera1.75 Tillich, who actually applies the analogy duorum 
ad tertium to God as the third entity to which finity and infinity, 
being and becoming are related, is guilty, claims Hartshorne, of rendering 
all theological discourse innocuous by claiming it is only "symbolic" of 
deity. He charges: 
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Is it not the case that Tillich's arguments for his more radically 
symbolic view are themselves at best symbolic, unable to meet 
logical tests? True, Tillich seems at times to argue from Being-
Itself, which he says is to be taken literally. But how can it 
so be taken, when our experience, itself a process, discloses 
only processes and what can be abstracted therefrom? A "being" 
which is neither any process nor any datal constituent of process, 
but something simpliciter more inclusive than all process - this 
cannot, it seems, have literal meaning, for nothing of the sort 
appears in experiencing. At best, "being" in this sense seems a 
reference to traditional metaphysics by faith taken as a symbol 
of what no experience could exhibit." 
Thus, the desire to place God outside the categories of experience places 
Tillich in the classical stream with St. Thomas who deemed the character 
of God so beyond human categories that we can only say what He is not. 
To repeat, however, the claim of Hartshorne: in the strictly formal sense 
we can know the logical meaning of the modal polarities of God which speak 
of his all-inclusiveness and which coincide in him. 
The third stratum of religious discourse builds on the foregoing 
understanding. If God is formally describable as ideally, eminently, 
and universally relative, then non-formal descriptions need not be in 
logical contradiction:to the formal. Rather, the non-formal are applic-
able to deity in degrees. Here Hartshorne speaks in terms of psychical 
attributes. Since, as he says, "all functions are God-functions,"77and 
the real infinity of God consists in his all-inclusiveness and the 
omnipotentiality to be so, religious phrases such as "God loves," "God 
wills," "God knows" are capable of literal acceptance when translated 
into the form of "all-loving," "all-willing," "all-knowing." As noted 
earlier, Hartshorne roots the literal knowledge and applicability of these 
psychical concepts in the setting of worship where one gains a "religious 
intuition" of the comprehensive character of the word "all," and, hence, 
28 
an intuition of God Himself as the Wholeness of reality. The un- 
conditional demands for total sympathy and care for all reality re- 
flect the all-encompassing care, sympathy and feeling which he bears 
for the whole creation. Thus, psychical concepts such as feeling, 
memory, sympathy are not really applied analogically to God from creature- 
ly experience. Rather, the reverse is true. In worship comes the 
realization of the literal, universal sense of such concepts and this 
basic religious insight allows the affirmation that "analogical con- 
cepts apply literally to deity and analogically to creatures."78  
Hartshorne deems this stratum "problematic" precisely because 
human awareness ofdand participation in psychical realities is limited. 
Hartshorne urges that we replace the negative theology with a positive 
and literal awareness of the formal properties of deity and affirm 
a new "negative anthropology." 
We see that the term "know" in the human case turns out to 
have a rather indefinite meaning. In the divine case, the 
matter is simple: God, as infallible, has absolutely con- 
clusive evidence concerning all truths, so that if knowledge 
is possession of perfect evidence as to the state of affairs, 
then God simply knows - period. No such plain definition will 
work for human knowledge. In this sense, it is the theistic 
use only of psychical conceptions which has literal meaning, 
a meaning from which all other meanings are derived by qualifi- 
cation, diminution or negation. So, instead of the old "negative 
theology," one might propose a new "negative anthropology."0  
We are, claims Hartshorne, to exploit the "intuition which we have 
of God tin worship] ." For, the "awareness of God furnishes a criterion 
for the weakness of man."
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The divine-human contrast stands at the 
basis of all human thought and speaking. The problematic nature of 
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language at this level is the task of defining the exact scope and limits 
of relational reference for each resemblance to deity and to the intuition 
of him. It is clear in any case that the participation of human qualities 
in the divine standard or logos is not to be denied without destroying 
the very possibility of analogy. For example, if God is Father (all-
caring, all-loving) he cannot be at the same time unfatherly in essentia  
on the pretext that ',similarity to a father in such respects would be 
'anthropomorphic' or univocal.u81 This insistence on forbidding God 
positive and literal contents, even in such abstractions as immutability, 
eternity and the like, inevitably exposes the theological use of ana-
logy to the charges of vagueness, inappropriateness and self-contra-
diction.82  
An all too negative theology made God the great emptiness, and 
an all too negative anthropology made the creatures also empty. 
I suggest that nothing is only nothing, that the divine attributes, 
are positive, and the creatures' qualities are between these and 
nothing.°, 
CHAPTER V 
IAN T. RAMSEY: AN EXCURSUS 
In Chapter IV it was noted that Charles Hartshorne rooted the 
linguistic meaning of the word 'God' in the religious experience of 
worship. There one learns of integrity by encountering the demands of 
total response placed upon the believer. There the primal awareness of 
the all-inclusiveness of God is most intense. Hartshorne acknowledges 
that such an insight parallels some of the investigations of Ian T. 
Ramsey.84 For that reason it may prove profitable to examine a portion 
of the writings of Ramsey on religious language. 
Ramsey begins, as did Hartshorne, in that realm which he characterizes 
as a "characteristically religious situation." These are situations 
in which something uoddu occurs and men become aware that they are more 
than any of their public behavior.85 At such a point "the ice breakspu 
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"the light dawns," "the penny drops." In short, one is overcome by 
a flash of insight. This experience, however, is not merely subjective. 
Such a situation has an "objective" character in so far as it is rooted 
in empirical language and reality. When empirical phrases are "strained" 
to their limits they evoke discernment and ',depth', emerges.87 It so happens 
that in this process theological language will arrive at certain tauto-
logical functionaries which are to act as "key words," the "ultimates 
of explanation."88 Remembering Hartshorne, the tautological is, of course, 
the necessary. It resides beyond strict object language. Put otherwise, 
our conclusion is that for the religious man “God“ is a key 
word, an irreducible posit, an ultimate of explanation ex- 
31 
pressive of the kind of commitment he professes. It is to be 
talked about in terms of the object language over which it pre-
sides, but only when this object language is qualified; in which 
case this qualified object-language becomes also currency for that 
odd discernment with which religious commitment, when a is not 
bigotry or, fanaticism, will necessarily be associated.u7  
Object-language is qualified in several ways for religious use. 
The first method is that of negative theology. Negative theology must 
describe God obliquely at the cost of positive knowledge and literal 
conceptualization. As it stands it has value as an evocative meditative 
technique190 in which nay-saying leads to an awareness of the effulgence 
of God. Secondly, there is the way of contrasting words like unity, 
simplicity, perfection with their opposites. The very logical tension 
created inevitably evokes commitment.91 Finally, the third method 
distinguishes the "model-qualifier" technique. Qualification refines 
the model until commitment occurs. The concept or model of "cause," for 
example, is qualified with "first," until the primacy of divinity 
is discerned in commitment. All words, if suitably molded and qualified, 
will function religiously, that is to say, will evoke discernment-commit-
ment. In an observation again similar to Hartshorne Ramsey claims that 
God can be seen in all the words of His creation, if logically qualified 
(supra, p.21', footnote 61).92  
Theologically, the word 'God' functions and behaves in much the 
same way the word 'I' does. From the assertions "I exist" and "God 
exists" nothing strictly verifiable can be deduced, yet both function as 
the presupposition of personal existence and speaking, on the one hand, and 
scientific, cosmic existence and discourse, on the other hand. Finally,  
religious language is grounded in the personal...the personal 
is not only a category which is never wholly reducible to 
scientific terms, but...interlocks with all the divee languages 
of science to unite them as a common presupposition." 
God, then, is that invariant "which is anchored objectively in a dis—
closure situation, when that situation involves the whole universe.11
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And in all cases it is in worship that one must seek the plotting, 
mapping and qualificational arousal of theological phrases: 
Here then is a method by which not only are problems overcame, 
but where at every point we ploy and map our theological 
phrases with reference to a characteristically religious situation 
one of worship, wonder, awe. Without such an empirical anchorage 
all our theological thinking is in vain, and where there is 
controversy and argument we are to look for their resolution 
where they are fulfilled: in, worship.95 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Chapter I 
This chapter states the problem in the form of the question: In 
what way and to what degree is discourse about God analogical? The 
proposal is made to examine the writings of three men in order to draw 
a tentative conclusion. These men are E. L. Mascall, a neo-Thomist philo- 
sopher, Charles Hartshorne, a philosopher of religion who builds on the 
insights of process philosophy, and Ian T. Ramsey. The first and third 
of these three are to be understood in relation to Charles Hartshorne. 
Chapter II 
This study deals cursorily with the Thomistic doctrine of God in 
so far as it necessitates a doctrine of analogy. God, who essence is 
unknowable, can be spoken of negatively, relationally, or positively. In 
the application of positive attributes to God discourse about Him tends 
toward one of two polar extremities - univocity or equivocity. Univocity 
is suspect of immanentism (pantheism, anthropomorphism); equivocity yields 
a radical separation of God and the creature in spite of mutual attribution, 
that is to say, words mutually applied do not have a meaningful point of 
common reference in experiential reality. 
The doctrine of analogy acts as a "middle way,' between such extremes. 
Two types of analogy are generally recognized, although interpretations 
of them are complex. These are the analogy of attribution and the analogy 
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of proportionality. Both these analogies fail to offer a literal, formal 
knowledge of God. Analogy of attribution affirms no more than that 
God is able to cause the effects spoken of in language; analogy of pro-
portionality offers no literal knowledge of either the third or fourth 
term on the right side of a proportion comparing the creature (and his 
mode of being) and God (and his mode of being). Mascall affirms that 
the equivocation which results from the absence of a third-term knowledge 
can be overcome through-the postulation of an analogy of attribution or 
"creative causality", God's existential relation with the world, which, 
in turn:  interlocks with the analogy of proportionality to explain how 
talk about God has been possible all along. Such an affirmation is 
based upon a theory of religious cognition which recognizes that things, 
/101 truth and trans-sensible reality are all known by the intellect through 
sensible phenomena as the medium of cognition. Thus, the substantial 
is grasped through the accidental; the relationship between cause and 
effect is interdependent. 
This chapter concludes with a short perusal of some more general 
criticisms which a radical doctrine of analogy has had to endure. Citations 
from Dorothy Emmet and John McIntyre as representative samples reveale_ 
that some literal or essential knowledge of God's basic character was 
necessary before analogical speaking is:-able to claim validity. 
Chapter III 
This study surveys briefly the "neoclassical" or "panentheistic" 
doctrine of God as the basis of a doctrine of analogy and religious 
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language. The study proffers Hartshorne's doctrine of "di-polar theism" 
which states that finitude and infinitude, actuality and potentiality, 
necessity and contingency are supremely present as the polarities of 
Process-Itself. God's nature is seen to be social in nature and, there-
fore, personal and interactive in the eminent sense. God is universally 
related to all finitude and, therefore, is supremely abstract and supremely 
concrete. He is also both determined by the acts of creatures which 
comprise his finitude and yet free in his omnipotentiality to accept 
and harmonize whatever world may come to be. 
Chapter IV 
This chapter indicates how the all-relatedness of God is brought to 
bear in a doctrine of analogy and religious language. The Self, being 
universal in its relations, acts as the universal datum of experience, 
of which linguistic experience claims importance. It is in the setting 
of worship that linguistic experience is best utilized for religious 
discourse. In that setting the dimension of totality directs the wor-
shipper to perceive that God is implicit in all dimensions of experience 
in much the same way the word 'I' functions as common to all experience 
of the human self. This awareness is a realization through the religious 
intuition of the all-encompassing nature of God of the necessity of 
experience, the absence of which is impossible and which serves as the 
cohesive factor to which the word 'God' is applicable. All language is 
to be seen in the light of that necessity. For that reason theological 
statements fall into the same class as metaphysical statements. Such 
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assertions take seriously both the completely nonrestrictive (necessary) 
and existential (contingent) aspects of Reality as Process. This is 
another way of saying that the accidental is dependent upon the necessary. 
Three classes of theological assertion are noted in Hartshorne's 
writing: symbolic, literal and analogical. Symbolical statements are 
classed so because they deal with a fragmentary portion of reality 
inadequate for description of the Whole. Literal:religious discourse is 
based on those abstract principles which spmmPrize the infinite (as 
temporal magnitude) concrete identity of the Process-Itself. They in-
clude negatively formulated attributesj but are nonetheless formally 
positive and literal in so far as they are universals rooted in a con-
crete reality. Analogical concepts are based on the literal intuition of 
divinity available in the religious experience of all-relatedness. Such 
concepts are literally applicable to deity according to the nature of the 
intuition and are analogically applicable to creatures according to the 
degree to which they are able to approximate the activity of God. Thus, 
Hartshorne suggests a negative anthropology in which ..one is capable of 
only dimly perceiving the way in which man loves, knows,.feels, etc., while 
fully capable in the religious intuition of the divine of perceiving 
the way in which God carries out psychical activities, namely, totally. 
All psychical experience, then, must claim degrees of diminution in com-
parison with the intensity and universality of the divine standard. 
Chapter V 
In his own explication of religious language Charles Hartshorne in- 
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timates awareness of the writings of Ian T. Ramsey. This chapter aims to 
draw on that intimation by treating Ian T. Ramsey as an illuminative 
parallel. Ramsey, like Hartshorne, finds that empirical phrases take 
on religious significance in a "characteristically religious situation." 
Words and verifiable experience are pushed to a logical limit, after which 
something "odd" occurs and "discernment" is evoked. At the basis of such 
discernment are "key words" which stand at the apex of experience as 
"ultimates of explanation." These words go beyond the objective as the 
very matrix of its occurrence. 
All language must be qualified through negation, contrast, or 
qualification in order to function religiously. Such a process yields 
commitment wherein 'God' functions, like III, as the fundamentum of 
cosmic experience, tautological, unverifiable, yet unfalsifiable and 
therefore present in all forms of experience as the presupposition of 
its possibility and meaning. Such an awareness of the Necessary occurs 
pre-eminently in the setting of worship. 
Concluding Remarks 
The initial query concerning the manner in and the degree to which 
discourse about God is analogical may now be answered in several ways. 
First, the alternative of E. L. Mascall is to claim an analogical 
epistemology in which all awareness of God is indirect and analogical, 
although valid. This might be designated mitigated equivocation - 
mitigated because knowledge and discourse does in fact occur, equivocation 
because of the reticence to admit full and literal conceptualization and 
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discourse about the divine. Secondly, the option of Charles Hartshorne 
is to stress that analogy is possible only on the basis of literal 
apprehension. Such a literal apprehension is available, and here he 
receives support from Ian T. Ramsey, in the situation of worship. In 
so far as all reality is a continuum-in-process the very disjunction 
between the world and God implicit in the theism of Thomas is avoided 
by Hartshorne and analogy is allegedly restored to a status of logical 
respectability by literally basing analogy on experience of the divine 
as all-related. The position of both Hartshorne and Ramsey might be 
designated as reasonable or qualified univocity - reasonable and qualified 
because discourse about God participates in the lbgical class of meta-
physically universal and necessary statements, univocity because the status 
of the empirical world and empirical language as a polar reality of God 
(his accidental nature) is not to be derogated. 
These respective positions of mitigated equivocity, on the one hand, 
and reasonable univocity,on the other hand, tend to result in essentially 
different ways of formulating the question of divine knowledge and re-
ferential religious language. The Thomistic position tends to ask, "How 
can that which is essentially beyond all experience be legitimately con- 
ceptualized and spoken of as personal?fl Expectedly, it tends to respond, 
as did Mescal', with an analogical epistemology inherent in its suppositions. 
The neoclassical position of Hartshorne phrases the question rather, "In 
what manner can the supremely relative Self be appropriately conceived 
and spoken of in an absolute manner?" It responds in kind with a theory 
of religious language that is based on the manner in which the word 'I' 
is used in human experience. 
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In both cases there are difficulties. First, in the case of Mascall 
it is held dubious by some that phenomenal reality can really act as an 
indicator of the divine without some formal knowledge which may serve 
as a standard of comparison. Those who tend to disagree- with Mascall's 
position would ask whether such an insistence on the radically analogical 
nature of knowledge and speaking of the divine may tend to degenerate into 
a pious form of projection, a kind of pseudo-analogy which knows in the 
fullest sense no ground of predication but casts some form of intra 
experiential relation, for example, "cause,'' on to a transcendent real 
which is strictly unknowable? Those who agree would most likely respond 
that one may not project exnept upon something and that the very projected 
image when magnified according to the infinite. extension of the divine 
indeed furnishes the awareness. Secondly, the reasonable univocity of 
Hartshorne may possibly be more radically analogical than seems apparent 
at first glance. Although he is attempting to derive a non-analogical 
metaphysic, is not his very model dependent on his selection of that 
reality which is to serve analogously, namely, the self? Furthermore, 
what is the validity of basing a literal knowledge of God upon a religious 
intuition available in worship? Again, how does one relate to a formal 
aspect of divinity? How does Hartshorne's theory of completely nonre- 
strictive statements hold up under the critique of Collingwood, Carnap 
and others who would contend that universals of being merely represent 
the limiting case, of the abstractive process? Would such a criticism 
tend to destroy the infinite pole of Hartshorne's God and reinstate the 
supremacy of the contingent as the necessary.96 Is it possible that de- 
ference to the necessary in order to establish the possibility of the possible 
is an act of faith? Have not the radical empiricists gotten on quite well 
with the brute fact of contingency? 
Such are the questions which this study has generated. In the 
intricate search for establishing a valid human basis for the perception 
of the divine one pauses to wonder with McIntyre whether that phenomenological 
emergence of God in unhiddenness and disclosure of Himself must not 
serve as that literal standard by which we speak of and praise Him. 
The philosophers have helped us to see that analogies must be 
carefully scrutinised for positive and negative content, and 
graded accordingly. But ultimately analogies establish them-
selves not by their conformity to the rubrics of medieval or 
modern logic, or yet to the requirements of an anti-metaphysical 
metaphysic, but by the living relation in which they stand to 
the living Word of God, to the worshipping and obedient community, 
and to the salvation of God's children.97 
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